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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates how angel investors’ human capital affects the valuation of their 
portfolio companies at initial investment, based on the pre-money valuation of 59 investments 
in young Belgian companies. We show that entrepreneurs are able to negotiate higher 
valuations with angel investors who have a business degree, more entrepreneurial experience 
or previous professional law experience. As such, this result is in contrast with the behavior of 
venture capital investors. Angel investors with financial experience, however, value their 
investments lower: their financial background leads them to stress the financial side of the 
deal more. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Financing is a critical resource for entrepreneurial companies due to their lack of track 
record, profit generation and tangible assets, all of which result in high uncertainty for 
potential investors. After having depleted their own resources, including those of family and 
friends, entrepreneurs may turn to external sources of private financing such as angel 
investors or venture capitalists. As venture capitalists increasingly shift their attention towards 
larger and older investments, it has become even more difficult to obtain the crucially needed 
funds for young companies or ventures that only need small amounts of financing (European 
Commission 2003; Mason and Harrison 2000). As such, there is a large gap for angel 
investors to fill between, on the one hand, whatever maximum amount entrepreneurs can 
secure from their family and friends and, on the other hand, the minimum amount venture 
capitalists are willing to invest. In the U.S.A., for instance, this gap is estimated to range 
between $ US 100 000 and $ US 5.0 million (Freear et al. 2002; Sohl 2003). The importance 
of angel investors for entrepreneurial companies hence cannot be underestimated. Within this 
paper, angel investors are defined as individuals who invest some of their own wealth in 
unlisted companies in exchange for shares and who have no family or friend connection to the 
entrepreneur (Mason and Harrison 1995; Mason 2006). 
As is the case for venture capital, angel money comes at a cost, which is reflected in 
the venture’s valuation. Valuation is a critical part of the angel investment process, as it 
determines the percentage of shares the investor gets in return for the investment. A higher 
initial valuation lowers the return potential for the investor, everything else equal. Conversely, 
the valuation drives the dilution the entrepreneur faces. For entrepreneurs the valuation hence 
determines their cost of capital and their retained equity stake, whereas for risk capitalists it 
can be seen as their assessment of the venture’s quality and potential (Hsu 2004). Despite its 
key role in the risk capital decision-making process, the little valuation research that exists to 
date in the entrepreneurial finance literature has exclusively focused on venture capital 
financing and hence ignored angel financing (e.g. Armstrong et al. 2006; Hsu 2004; 2007). 
Furthermore, most attention has been paid to how portfolio company characteristics drive 
these venture capital-backed companies’ valuations. More specifically, research has shown 
that more experienced entrepreneurs and higher-quality companies receive higher valuations 
(Armstrong et al. 2006; Hand 2005; Hsu 2007). Relatively no attention has been paid to the 
impact of investor characteristics, with an important exception being Hsu (2004) who showed 
that more experienced and reputable venture capitalists are able to negotiate lower valuations. 
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With this paper, we aim to extend this stream of research by examining the impact of 
angel investors’ human capital on their portfolio companies’ first-round valuations. Building 
on Hsu (2004), we hence recognize the importance of heterogeneity in the investor 
population, a feature which is even more pronounced in the angel investor world compared to 
the professional venture capital world (Harrison and Mason 1999). As their education and 
experience differs, so will their human capital (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Moreover, some 
specific types of education and experience may be more valuable in the context of risk capital 
financing than others (Dimov and Shepherd 2005), leading to different effects on valuation.  
As such, this study contributes to the entrepreneurship literature by addressing two 
specific gaps: (1) the neglect of studying the effect of investor features in valuation 
negotiations between external investors and entrepreneurs, and (2) the scarcity of theory-
grounded research on angel investors. Despite angel financing increasing in importance – 
especially in these harder economic times (EBAN 2009) - it is still a relatively 
underresearched area.  Furthermore, the research that does exist has not yet quite outgrown its 
“Cinderella status” (Mason 2006, p.3; Maula et al. 2005). This study therefore addresses these 
gaps in the literature by providing an insight into the determinants of angel-backed 
companies’ valuations. Furthermore, by building on venture capital literature it also allows us 
to compare the valuation practices of venture capitalists and angel investors.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. First, hypotheses are developed 
regarding the impact of the angel investors’ human capital on their portfolio companies’ 
valuation. Following Dimov and Shepherd (2005), a distinction is made between the 
investors’ general human capital, represented by their education level and entrepreneurial 
experience, and their specific human capital, represented by their business education and 
professional finance or law experience. Finally, we describe the research method, present the 
findings and discuss the results, contributions and limitations. 
 
 6 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In negotiating a venture’s valuation, entrepreneurs and external investors are generally 
assumed to be driven by opposite incentives. On the one hand entrepreneurs aim to maximize 
valuation as that implies giving up a minimum of equity in return for the investment (Vance 
2005). Risk capitalists on the other hand are likely to prefer a minimum valuation as this 
determines the price paid for the equity obtained at investment and hence also the return 
potential at exit (Hsu 2007; Mason and Harrison 2002). Although angel investors and venture 
capitalists are two distinct categories of risk capitalists, recent research has indicated that both 
investors’ expected returns are comparable, namely 58 percent annually (DeGennaro and 
Dwyer 2009).  
Tying into that traditional view, one could therefore expect a negative relationship 
between an angel investor’s human capital and portfolio company valuation. More 
specifically, just like venture capitalists, angel investors are considered value-adding investors 
or a type of ‘smart money’ (Mason 2006; Sapienza et al. 1996). The more experienced and 
better educated these investors are, the more value-adding potential they hence represent to 
their potential portfolio companies as the latter can benefit more from the investors’ education 
and experience (Hsu 2004). Furthermore, better educated and more experienced angel 
investors might also have a better reputation in this market (Kelly and Hay 2000) and might 
therefore serve as certifiers of the ventures’ value to the outside world (Hsu 2004). Both 
reputation and value-adding services could provide angel investors with leverage when 
negotiating with entrepreneurs, hence resulting in lower valuations. Entrepreneurs might be 
willing to pay for affiliation with investors with high levels of human capital. 
However, arguments can also be made the other way around, as angel investors are 
known to not solely invest for financial reasons, but also for, among others, personal 
satisfaction, opportunities to influence the development of a new venture and job creation 
(Harrison and Mason 1992; Landström 1993). This more altruistic side of the relationship 
between angel investors and entrepreneurs is also illustrated by the fact that, compared to 
venture capital contracts, angel contracts are more entrepreneur-friendly, have weaker control 
rights, use less contractual provisions and are used more from a transactional than a control 
point of view (Goldfarb et al. 2008; Ibrahim 2008; Kelly and Hay 2003; Landström et al. 
1998; Wong 2002). As an individual’s general education level increases, so will his or her 
wealth (Astebro and Bernhardt 2005; Colombo and Grilli 2005; Holtz-Eaking et al. 1994).  
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As such, non-financial motivations to make angel investments will only gain in 
importance, resulting in less emphasis on the financial (and hence valuation) side of the 
equation. Furthermore, having benefited from a high-level education should also increase 
investors’ confidence in their own capabilities and hence increase their perceived behavior 
control (Maula et al. 2005). These increased feelings of control will reduce the investor’s risk 
perception, which could bias their evaluation of investment opportunities upwards, resulting 
in higher valuations. This leads to: 
 
H1: Receiving financing from angel investors with a higher-level education will result 
in higher valuations for the portfolio company concerned. 
 
Next to education level, we argue that an investor’s general experience as an 
entrepreneur will have an impact on valuations. First, experienced angel investors should be 
able to conduct a more thorough, insightful due diligence, which may result in lower 
uncertainty and more confidence in the venture’s success and hence an inclination towards 
higher company valuations (Batjargal and Liu 2004; Wiltbank 2005). Further, more 
entrepreneurial experience is likely to result in several biases on the investor’s part. Similar to 
high-level education, it should also increase an investor’s perceived behavior control (Maula 
et al. 2005). Familiarity – which, in the angel investment context, is induced by 
entrepreneurial experience – has been shown to lead to more favorable assessments of 
potential investments (Huberman 2001), which in this particular setting could thus lead to 
higher valuations. Research has also shown experienced angel investors to be less concerned 
with agency risk than their less experienced counterparts (Van Osnabrugge 1998). Therefore, 
more experienced angel investors should behave even more as partners (Kelly and Hay 2003; 
Van Osnabrugge 1998). These relationships, characterized by more trust and lower perceived 
risk, could also positively bias investors’ assessments of potential investments (Batjargal and 
Liu 2004; Dimov and Shepherd 2005), which in turn may result in higher valuations. Angel 
investors with entrepreneurial experience will also be able to sympathize more towards these 
‘wannabe entrepreneurs’. This increased empathy will in turn enhance their tendency to 
behave more as helping partners towards these entrepreneurs (Batson and Coke 1981) and less 
as return-maximizing investors. Again this should therefore result in higher valuations. Hence, 
the second hypothesis is: 
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H2: Receiving financing from angel investors with more entrepreneurial experience 
will result in higher valuations for the portfolio company concerned. 
 
So far, we have only considered the effect of the angel investors’ general human 
capital, developed through their level of education and their experience as entrepreneurs. 
Equally important to study though is the nature of their human capital (Colombo and Grilli 
2005). Even more so than general education and experience, specific education and 
experience can be considered as proxies for the investor’s competences or capabilities for the 
tasks at hand (Colombo and Grilli 2005). Within this paper, the focus is on business education 
and professional experience in finance and law positions as these have generally been 
mentioned as the most relevant types of specific human capital for risk capitalists (Dimov and 
Shepherd 2005).  
The ability to accumulate new knowledge is positively related to an individual’s 
existing stock of knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). The more this stock of knowledge 
specifically relates to the task at hand, the more efficient individuals are in accumulating and 
interpreting new knowledge related to that task (Dimov and Shepherd 2005). A business 
education typically focuses on building and managing companies. Investors with a business 
education should hence be more productive and efficient in recognizing and evaluating new 
opportunities presented to them by entrepreneurs, which is especially valuable in the due 
diligence phase. A business education hence enables investors to have a more in-depth 
understanding of the opportunities presented to them, leading to higher valuations. We 
therefore propose: 
 
H3: Receiving financing from angel investors with a business degree will result in 
higher valuations for the portfolio company concerned. 
 
Individuals do not only formally acquire knowledge through education, but also tacitly 
acquire relevant knowledge while accumulating experience in a particular domain (Lam 2000; 
Nonaka 1994). Specific human capital in the form of professional experience in finance or law 
should increase an investor’s expertise in the valuation, negotiation and deal structuring phase 
of the investment decision process thanks to learning effects (Dimov and Shepherd 2005; Hsu 
2007).  
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Previous finance and law experience will have confronted angel investors with 
different valuation and deal structuring problems, enabling them to have a deeper 
understanding of value drivers and of the impact of deal structure on valuation and value 
distribution. In contrast, negotiating an equity investment is often a once-in-a-lifetime 
experience for an entrepreneur. Hence, investors with finance or law experience should be 
more skilled than entrepreneurs in valuing and structuring deals, putting them in a more 
advantageous negotiation position compared to entrepreneurs. Further, their professional 
experience should increase their focus on the financials of their investment. Whereas 
entrepreneurship is mainly about opportunity recognition and exploitation, finance and law 
experts are typically more concerned with risk and risk management (Dimov et al. 2007; 
Shane and Venkataraman 2000). We therefore expect investors with a professional finance or 
law experience to negotiate as low valuations as possible, so as to maximise the expected 
returns for a given level of risk. As such, we hypothesize: 
 
H4a: Receiving financing from angel investors with more finance experience will 
result in lower valuations for the portfolio company concerned. 
 
H4b: Receiving financing from angel investors with more law experience will result in 
lower valuations for the portfolio company concerned. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Data 
The hypotheses are tested based on a dataset of Belgian angel-backed companies. In 
order to reduce sample selection bias and obtain the most representative sample possible, 20 
different data sources were used to identify angel-backed companies, including a random 
directory of start-ups, deal lists of angel networks, Global Entrepreneurship Monitor data 
(from the Belgian chapter), directories of high-technology companies, media articles, 
incubators and snowballing. After having contacted all companies by phone to ensure they 
had indeed received angel financing, this resulted in a sample of 102 angel-backed companies. 
Due to data unavailability, the sample size was however further reduced to 59, representing 45 
angel investors.  
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Data for this study were gathered through three instruments. More specifically, (1) 
valuation and investment information was retrieved from the Belgian Law Gazette1; (2) 
human capital variables from questionnaires sent to and interviews conducted with the angel 
investors of these companies, (3) information on patent applications from the European Patent 
Office and (4) the remaining variables from the companies’ financial accounts which all 
Belgian companies are obliged to file with the National Bank of Belgium. The latter were 
retrieved from the Bel-first database by Bureau Van Dijk.  
 
Dependent variable 
The analyses focus on the pre-money valuation of angel-backed companies. Following 
Hsu (2004), pre-money valuation is defined as the product of the number of shares 
outstanding prior to the initial angel investment and the offered per-unit share price. As such, 
any potential changes in the value of the venture introduced by the angel investment itself are 
excluded. All numbers are inflation-adjusted. The mean pre-money valuation of the firms in 
the sample is 1 016 405 EUR, ranging from a minimum valuation of 22 925 EUR up to a 
maximum valuation of 5 746 459 EUR in a biotech company (see Table 1). 
 
Independent variables 
Five variables were included in the model to measure the angel investors’ human 
capital (Colombo and Grilli 2005). When more than one angel invested in the same venture 
through a syndicate, the characteristics of the lead investor were used as the lead investor 
typically steers the negotiations (Wright and Lockett 2003). The lead investor was defined as 
the individual investing the largest amount of money. Entrepreneurial experience was 
measured as a dummy variable, representing high (value 1) versus low (value 0) levels of 
experience. This was the result of a median split of the sample based on the number of years 
work experience as a founder and/or entrepreneur (median was 10 years of entrepreneurial 
experience). Education level was also measured as a dummy variable for high (value 1- high 
being a Master’s or PhD degree) versus low (value 0) levels. The nature of the angel 
investor’s human capital was measured by a dummy variable representing whether or not the 
angel investor had a business degree (1 if (s)he had, 0 if (s)he had not) and two other variables 
representing the number of years work experience in a finance and/or law position.  
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Control variables 
Previous research has shown valuations of risk-capital backed companies to be 
significantly affected by company characteristics (Armstrong et al. 2006; Hand 2005). As the 
studies by Hsu (2004; 2007) represent our main point of comparison, it was deemed 
appropriate to include similar control variables as the ones used in those two studies. 
Therefore, controls are added for company age at time of investment2, industry, patents, 
period of investment and amount injected by the angel investor. Industry was represented by a 
dummy variable taking the value 1 if the company is active in the software and internet (ICT) 
industry and 0 otherwise3. As the number of patent applications was generally low, a dummy 
variable was included taking on the value 1 if the company had applied for patents prior to 
investment and 0 if it had not. Valuations of unquoted ventures are affected by valuations in 
the stock markets (Hand 2005), hence period of the angel investment is controlled for by 
another dummy variable taking on the value 1 if the investment took place during the bubble 
period, i.e. 1999 up to 2001, and 0 otherwise.  
 
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reveals that companies in our database are, on average, three years old at the 
time of first investment, with over 50 percent of the sample being start-up investments. 
Almost half of the companies (26, or 44%) operate in internet and software-related industries, 
with the other half mainly being active in the service and consumer goods industries. Roughly 
one fourth of the investments were made during the internet bubble period, i.e. between 1999 
and 2001, indicating a nice spread in terms of time of investments. Finally, only six 
companies (10 percent) had applied for patents prior to receiving angel money. Most 
companies have been successful as supported by their ability to raise follow-on financing (64 
percent have had follow-on rounds) and their relatively low failure rate to date (24 percent 
have failed in the meantime4). 
Insert Table 1 About Here 
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The average angel investor in this sample was 45 years old at time of investment, 
predominantly male (only one female investor), had 11 years of entrepreneurial experience, 
14 years of managerial experience, 3 years of working experience in a finance position and 
half a year in a law position. Half of the angel investors have a Master’s degree or higher, 
with most of these degrees being in business. Angel investors take up a seat on the Board of 
Directors in the vast majority of the portfolio companies (81 percent). The angel investors’ 
investment behaviour and characteristics are hence consistent with those of angel investors in 
other countries (e.g. Mason 2006), supporting the external validity of this study. 
 
Hypotheses tests 
Hypotheses are tested using log-linear OLS regression (Hand 2003; Hsu 2007), with 
cluster-robust standard errors. The log-transformation was deemed appropriate due to the 
skewed distribution of the valuation numbers and the aptness of this technique for dealing 
with non-linearities in the relationship between the dependent and independent variables 
(Armstrong et al. 2006; Hand 2003). Furthermore, it should also lessen the impact of outliers. 
Cluster-robust standard errors were used to control for multiple investments by the same angel 
investor (Wooldridge 2002). Table 2 includes the results of the hypotheses tests.  
Insert Table 2 About Here 
Model 1 includes the control variables only; the model is significant and explains 31 
percent of the variation in angel backed companies’ valuation in this sample. The results are 
consistent with previous valuation research (such as Hsu 2004 and Hsu 2007) in that both the 
number of patents applied for prior to investment and the amount invested by the angel 
investor are significant, positive indicators of angel-backed companies’ valuation. This is 
consistent with the notion that patents are considered a signal of venture quality and hence 
should be positively reflected in the venture’s valuation. The finding that the amount invested 
by the investor is positively related to valuation supports the argument that larger funding 
amounts can provide liquidity benefits to the entrepreneurial company or that they are a signal 
of higher growth opportunities.  Interestingly, valuations in the bubble period were only 
slightly higher than in the pre- or post-bubble periods, an effect which disappears in the full 
model.  
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This seems to be in contrast with valuations negotiated by venture capitalists in the 
same period or, put differently, angel investors seem to be less influenced by stock market 
valuations than venture capitalists. 
The hypothesized effects of the angel investor’s human capital are tested in model 2. 
Adding human capital variables to the valuation model adds significant explanatory power, as 
indicated by the statistically significant change in R2 (p < .05). The results show that 
education level does not have a significant effect on venture valuation and hence provide no 
support for hypothesis 1. Hypotheses 2 and 3 are supported in that entrepreneurs receive a 
higher valuation when their angel investors have more entrepreneurial experience (p < .05) or 
have a business degree (p < .01). These results are also economically significant. Having an 
investor with experience as an entrepreneur is associated with a 148% premium on the pre-
money valuation.  If the investor has a business degree, the pre-money value is 166% higher.  
Hypothesis 4 is partially supported. More specifically, the results show that valuations 
are lower when angel investors have more working experience in a finance position (p < .10), 
while law experience has a significant, positive effect. Hence, while hypothesis 4a is 
supported, hypothesis 4b is not as the effect of law experience is in the opposite direction of 
what was hypothesized. Both results are however economically significant, with the finance 
experience coefficient suggesting that as this variable doubles – holding all other variables 
constant – pre-money valuation will decrease by 12 %. Having an investor with law 
experience should result in a 24 % premium on the pre-money valuation. 
As having entrepreneurial experience and a business degree are the most important 
human capital predictors of angel-backed companies’ valuation (respectively, p = 0.03 and p 
= 0.01), it was deemed appropriate to further investigate their underlying mechanisms. For 
each of these two variables, the sample was split into two subsamples, i.e. angel investors with 
a business degree versus those without one and angel investors with high versus low 
entrepreneurial experience. The results of comparing these subsamples are summarized in 
Table 3.  
Insert Table 3 About Here 
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Comparisons between the subsamples divided based on angel investors having a 
business degree or not indicate that its positive effect on valuation might be the result of these 
angel investors having a tendency to select riskier investments. This is illustrated by their 
substantially higher proportion of biotechnology investments, a higher proportion of 
investments made during the bubble period as well as the higher failure rate of their 
investments.  
Differences between angel investors with high versus low entrepreneurial experience 
seem to be more driven by their investor characteristics rather than by their portfolio company 
characteristics. More experienced angel investors are namely also older, less educated and 
more science-oriented (as reflected by both their education and working experience). In terms 
of the companies they invest in, these investors do not invest in biotech companies, but they 
do provide substantially larger funding amounts to their portfolio companies. As such, this 
could be an indication of more experienced angel investors merely selecting better companies 
with more growth potential. However, table 3 also reveals that there are no differences 
between the failure rates of the portfolio companies of the experienced versus inexperienced 
angel investors. Other variables not included in the table further indicate that there are no 
substantial post-investment performance differences between these subsamples either.  
As funding amounts also play a significant role in predicting the valuation of angel-
backed companies (see Table 2), it was deemed appropriate to further investigate this 
alternative explanation of experienced investors selecting better companies. We therefore ran 
an additional test to check for a potential mediation effect of amount invested by the angel 
investor. In order to do so, we use the bootstrapping method (using 5 000 resamples) with 
bias-corrected confidence intervals as previous research indicated its superiority to the 
traditional products-of-coefficients analysis strategy in small samples and as it also allows for 
the inclusion of our control variables as covariates (Preacher and Hayes 2008; Williams and 
MacKinnon 2008). However, for reasons of exhaustiveness, traditional Sobel tests were also 
conducted and provided the same results.   
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
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As shown in Figure 1, the total effect of the angel investor’s entrepreneurial 
experience on the company’s valuation is significant (c = 1.34, p < .001). Once adjusted for 
the potential mediating effect of the investor’s funding amount, its direct effect is still 
significant, albeit to a lesser extent (c’= 0.90, p < .01). This result indicates that the effect of 
the angel investor’s entrepreneurial experience on valuation is partially mediated by the 
magnitude of funding. This interpretation is also supported by the fact that the indirect effect 
of entrepreneurial experience on valuation through amount invested is still significantly 
different from zero as suggested by its point estimate (0.43) and the 95 percent bias-corrected 
and accelerated confidence interval of 0.09 to 0.98 (which hence does not contain zero). 
Taken together, this supports the notion that angel investors’ entrepreneurial experience has a 
direct effect on valuation above and beyond its indirect effect through amount invested.   
 
DISCUSSION 
Despite valuation playing a crucial role for both entrepreneurs and investors, relatively 
little is known as to how investor characteristics impact company valuations (Hsu 2004). The 
goal of this paper was to study the effect of angel investors’ general and specific human 
capital on the first-round valuations of their portfolio companies. The findings reveal a 
significant, positive effect of the angel investor’s entrepreneurial experience (both direct and 
indirect), business education and law experience on the portfolio company’s valuation. Angel 
investor’s finance experience negatively affects company valuation, while education level has 
no effect. As such, this paper contributes to the entrepreneurship literature in two ways. 
Firstly, it contributes to this literature by focusing on angel investors who despite their 
importance to entrepreneurial ventures are still largely neglected by entrepreneurship 
researchers. Secondly, it also contributes to the entrepreneurship literature by studying the 
effect of investor human capital on company valuation, as valuation studies so far have 
generally exclusively focused on the effect of company characteristics (with Hsu 2004 being a 
notable exception).  
More specifically, the positive effect of angel investors’ entrepreneurial experience on 
venture valuation supports the argument that this experience reduces uncertainty and risk 
perception, both of which would result in more positive evaluations of potential portfolio 
companies. Further, experienced investors might relate more to the entrepreneurs’ side of the 
story (having been there themselves before), making them less inclined to stress the financial 
side of the equation.  
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Additional analyses also provided partial support for an alternative explanation, 
namely a selection effect. This refers to more experienced angel investors investing larger 
amounts in their portfolio companies and these larger amounts, in turn, leading to higher 
valuations. This would be in line with more experienced angel investors being able to select 
higher-quality deals with more growth potential (Kelly and Hay 2000), hence receiving higher 
valuations as a reward (as previously suggested by Armstrong et al. 2006; Hsu 2007). The 
partial mediation effect is essential at it shows that entrepreneurial experience also has a direct 
effect on company valuation. In other words, there is more to this story than experienced 
investors just selecting better companies. This would also be supported by the fact that the 
limited post-investment data at our disposal do not indicate any significant performance 
differences between portfolio companies of experienced and inexperienced angel investors. 
Finally, interesting to note is that these results are hence in contrast with findings from the 
venture capital industry that experienced investors are able to attract better quality deals at 
lower valuations (Hsu 2004). A similar result as for entrepreneurial experience was also 
expected for education level, but was not found. This is consistent with previous 
entrepreneurship research, which found that previous entrepreneurial experience, rather than 
general education, is the most important aspect of human capital in predicting entrepreneurial 
success: the skills and knowledge relevant in successfully managing and operating a business 
are mainly experiential in nature, rather than educational (Politis, 2005). This finding is hence 
supported in our business angel setting.  
The results further corroborate the notion that angel investors with a business degree 
also provide higher valuations. This would be in line with these investors having a more apt 
skill set for opportunity recognition and evaluation, reducing the risk involved, which could in 
turn result in higher valuations. Further exploration of the data would also support this 
argument as business degree-investors tend to select riskier investments with higher growth 
potential.  
The negative significant effect of the angel investors’ finance experience is consistent 
with the argument that this is expertise directly related to the core of the decision-making 
investment process, namely negotiation and deal structuring. Furthermore, investors with 
more finance expertise are likely to emphasize the financial side of the investment more than 
investors with no finance experience. A similar effect was expected for law experience, but 
was not found. More specifically, the results revealed a significant, positive effect for 
previous law experience. As we previously argued, investors with more law experience will 
probably be more able to put together watertight contracts.  
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Even though this might increase the focus on the financials of the deal, it might also 
reduce the risk associated with entering the relationship of interest. This reduced risk 
perception might in turn then lead to more positive evaluations of potential investments, 
resulting in a positive effect on venture valuation.  
In addition to contributing to the academic literature, our research also has an 
important lesson to teach entrepreneurs: if you want a high valuation, pick an experienced 
angel investor, preferably with an MBA but without finance experience! 
 
LIMITATIONS AND AREAS OF FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study is not without its limitations. First, all data are collected from Belgian 
angel-backed companies, which may limit the generalizability of the findings. This might be 
particularly true for the U.K. and U.S.A. as the angel financing market in those countries is 
more developed than it is in Continental Europe (EBAN 2005). However, the Belgian angel 
setting is quite similar to other continental European countries where results are thus more 
likely to hold. Further, Belgian socio-economic indicators as income distribution, employment 
rate, social security fees and trade balance are also similar to indicators in other European 
countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, France, Austria, Spain and Italy (Stroobandt et 
al. 2005). Second, hypotheses were tested based on a rather small sample. Relative to the 
number of predictors used in the model, this is however similar to other valuation studies of 
risk-capital backed companies (such as Hsu 2007). Furthermore, additional analysis 
techniques well-fit to dealing with small samples such as bootstrapping were used. 
Regardless, this does preclude the possibility of testing a more complete model including for 
instance financial statement information. Finally, we did not test for the impact of specific 
industry experience of the angel investor. One could argue that working experience in the 
same sector as the portfolio company could increase the investor’s expertise in that sector, 
which could then in turn also influence the venture’s valuation (either negatively through a 
reputation effect or positively through a more biased evaluation of the company). 
Unfortunately, these data were unavailable to us so this could not be included in the final 
model.  
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Based on the results and limitations of the study, there are several avenues for future 
research. First, it would be interesting to understand which underlying mechanisms explain 
the effect of angel investor human capital on company valuation. More specifically, we 
offered several potential explanations such as a selection, wealth and empathy effect. In order 
to test which of these effects is actually occurring or which is strongest, one would need 
(more) data on the post-investment performance of these companies, the personal wealth of 
the angel investors involved and feelings of these investors towards the entrepreneur and his 
or her company. Second, it would also be valuable to gather valuation data on the follow-on 
rounds of financing of these companies. As companies evolve through time, it is not unlikely 
that an angel investor’s role in these companies also changes and hence a different effect of 
their human capital could occur. Thirdly, considering the different effects that were found for 
angel investors’ human capital compared to what venture capital studies have found so far, it 
would also be interesting to see what the results would be in cases where both angel investors 
and venture capitalists co-invest and hence participate in valuation negotiations. Finally, as 
scholars have suggested similarity between investors and entrepreneurs to play a significant 
role in the investment process (e.g. Franke et al., 2006; Bruns et al., 2008), another interesting 
avenue for future research would be to look into the effects of fit between investor and 
entrepreneur human capital. In other words, would investor-entrepreneur pairs with similar 
human capital perform better than those with complementary human capital? 
To conclude, the results of this study show that investor heterogeneity matters and 
provides evidence for the widely accepted notion that angel investors are indeed very different 
creatures compared to venture capitalists. For the latter more human capital is seen as an 
economic good, which can then be traded against a higher price. For angel investors on the 
other hand more human capital allows them to let their non-rational (from a traditional finance 
theory point of view) side take over and sympathize more with entrepreneurs. However, it 
does not – as sometimes claimed – lead them to make unprofessional decisions. Whereas 
previous studies have tried estimating returns to angel investors (e.g. DeGennaro and Dwyer 
2009; Mason and Harrison 2002; Wiltbank and Boeker 2007), this study is the first to look 
into valuations of angel-backed companies and, as such, contributes to the entrepreneurship 
literature. We hope that our study will stimulate future research in this area.  
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FOOTNOTES 
1: All Belgian firms have the legal obligation to publish capital increases in the official 
Belgian Law Gazette, ensuring a reliable and unbiased account of equity investments in the 
portfolio companies. 
2: As a robustness check, analyses were also run including a dummy variable for start-up 
stage investments as a control variable instead of company age. Results remain the same. 
3: Hsu (2007) also added controls for the biotechnology and communications sector. These 
were not included in this model as there were relatively few companies in our sample active in 
those industries. 
4: Mason and Harrison (2002) report that 39% of U.K. angel investments exited as write-offs, 
while Goldfarb et al. (2008) report a 28% failure rate among U.S. angel investments. 
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TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 N = 59 for company characteristics, N = 45 for investor characteristics 
 
 
Variables Mean s.d. Min Max 
1. Company age 3.29 5.14 0.00 23.32 
2. Patents 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
3. ICT industry 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 
4. Bubble 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00 
5. Amount invested by angel investor (000 EUR) 203.74 295.89 2.50 1,914.98 
6. Education level (high/low) 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00 
7. Entrepreneurial experience (high/low)  0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 
8. Economics/ Business education  0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 
9. Finance experience  3.44 6.87 0.00 22.00 
10. Law experience 0.51 2.60 0.00 16.00 
11. Pre-money valuation (000 EUR) 1,016.41 1,404.91 22.92 5,746.46 
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TABLE 2: LOG-LINEAR OLS REGRESSION RESULTS WITH CLUSTER-ROBUST 
STANDARD ERRORS TESTING THE ANGEL INVESTOR’S HUMAN CAPITAL – 
VALUATION RELATIONSHIP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  †  .10 
  * p .05 
  ** p .01 
  *** p  .001 (one-tailed tests for hypothesized effects) 
 
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Control variables   
Company age (ln) 0.16*** 0.30†** 
ICT industry -0.21*** -0.07*** 
Patents 0.73*** 0.61*** 
Bubble period investment  0.48†** 0.34**v 
Angel investor amount invested (ln) 0.61*** 0.53*** 
   
Angel investor human capital variables   
Education level (high/low)  0.43†** 
Entrepreneurial experience (high/low)  0.91*** 
Business education  0.98*** 
Finance experience (ln)  -0.19†** 
Law experience (ln)  0.31*** 
   
R² 0.31**** 0.47*** 
Change in  R²  0.16*** 
Change in F  2.45*** 
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TABLE 3: UNIVARIATE COMPARISONS (BASED ON MANN-WHITNEY TESTS) 
BETWEEN ANGEL INVESTORS (1) WITH HIGH VERSUS LOW 
ENTREPRENEURIAL EXPERIENCE AND (2) WITH A BUSINESS DEGREE  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  †  .10 
  * p .05 
  ** p .01 
  *** p  .001  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Entrepreneurial 
experience 
Business degree 
 High Low With Without 
Portfolio company characteristics     
 
    
Company age 3.19 3.84*** 3.23 3.90*** 
Patents 0.12 0.10*** 0.10 0.12*** 
ICT industry  0.50 0.34*** 0.30 0.56*** 
Biotech industry  0.00 0.10*** 0.10 0.00*** 
Bubble period investments 0.19 0.31*** 0.33 0.12*** 
Amount invested by angel investor (000 EUR) 310.06 108.99*** 181.52 232.11*** 
Board of Directors seat 0.85 0.79*** 0.70 1.00*** 
Proportion failed investments 0.19 0.21*** 0.33 0.08*** 
 
    
Angel investor characteristics     
 
    
Investor age 48.00 42.22*** 44.69 45.72*** 
Bachelor degree 0.54 0.36†** 0.43 0.44*** 
Master degree 0.23 0.64*** 0.57 0.32*** 
Business degree 0.35 0.71*** 1.00 0.00*** 
Finance experience 1.85 4.07†** 4.69 1.04*** 
Law experience 0.62 0.18*** 0.00 0.84†** 
R&D experience 3.96 3.57†** 2.52 5.20*** 
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FIGURE 1: MEDIATION MODEL FOR ANGEL INVESTOR ENTREPRENEURIAL 
EXPERIENCE ON PORTFOLIO COMPANY VALUATION 
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